We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problema single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. When the agents' preferences are single-dimensional Myerson's seminal work [14] shows that randomness offers no benefit-the optimal mechanism is always deterministic. In the multidimensional case, where each agent's preferences are given by different values for each of the available services, Briest et al. [6] recently showed that the gap between the expected revenue obtained by an optimal randomized mechanism and an optimal deterministic mechanism can be unbounded even when a single agent is offered only 4 services. However, this large gap is attained through unnatural instances where values of the agent for different services are correlated in a specific way. We show that when the agent's values involve no correlation or a specific kind of positive correlation, the benefit of randomness is only a small constant factor (4 and 8 respectively). Our model of positively correlated values (that we call the common base value model) is a natural model for unit-demand agents and items that are substitutes. Our results extend to multiple agent settings as well.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental objective in the design of mechanisms is to maximize the seller's revenue. In the absence of any information about buyers' preferences, i.e. in prior-free settings, randomization is a frequently used algorithmic technique (see, e.g., [11] and references therein); In a spirit similar to randomness in online algorithm design, it allows the seller to hedge against adversarial values. While randomization unsurprisingly turns out to be essential for any guarantees on revenue in certain prior-free settings, it appears to be not so in Bayesian settings where the designer has distributional information about the agents' types and the goal is to maximize revenue in expectation over the distribution. For example, for a single item auction in the Bayesian setting, Myerson's seminal work [14] shows that the optimal mechanism is always a deterministic one.
In this work we investigate the power of randomness in the context of the following archetypical multi-parameter optimal mechanism design problem -a single seller offers multiple kinds of service, and a number of "unit-demand" agents are each interested in buying any one of the services. Whereas in Myerson's work each agent has a singledimensional type (namely a value for the item under sale), in our setting each agent has a multi-dimensional type characterized by a (different) value for each of the services offered by the seller. An example of this setting is the revenue maximization problem faced by an online travel agency selling airline tickets, hotel rooms, etc.; Customers have different preferences over different available services, but are only interested in buying one. We study the Bayesian version of this problem: the distribution from which the buyers' preferences are drawn is known to the seller. Given Myerson's observation about single-dimensional settings, one might expect that in the multi-dimensional case the optimal mechanism (ignoring computational issues) is once again deterministic. Thanassoulis [18] and Manelli and Vincent [12] independently discovered that this is not the case. This raises the following natural question: what quantitative benefit do randomized mechanisms offer over deterministic ones in Bayesian optimal mechanism design?
To answer this question we must first understand the structure of randomized mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings. In the context of a single unit-demand agent and a seller offering multiple items, any deterministic mechanism is simply a pricing for each of the items with the agent picking the one that maximizes her utility (her value for the item minus its price). Likewise, randomized mechanisms can be thought of as pricings for distributions or convex [18] contrasting the optimal item and lottery pricings. The regions R1, R2, and R Lot denote the sets of valuations at which the agent buys item 1, item 2, and the (1/2, 1/2) lottery respectively.
combinations over items. These convex combinations are called lotteries. A risk-neutral buyer with a quasilinear utility function buys the lottery that maximizes his expected value minus the price of the lottery.
The following example due to Thanassoulis explains how lotteries work. Suppose that a seller offers two items for sale to a single buyer, and that the buyer's value for each of the items is independently uniformly distributed in the interval [5, 6] . The optimal deterministic mechanism for the seller is to simply price each of the items at p * = $5.097 (see Figure 1 ). In a randomized mechanism, the seller may in addition price a (1/2, 1/2) distribution over the two items at a slightly lower price of p ′ = $5.057. If the buyer buys this lottery, the seller tosses a coin and allocates the first item to her with probability 1/2 and the second with probability 1/2. A buyer that is nearly indifferent between the two items would prefer to buy the lottery because of its lower cost, than either one of the items. While the seller loses some revenue by selling the lower priced lottery with some probability, he gains by selling to a larger segment of the market (those that cannot afford either of the individual items but can afford the lower priced lottery). In this example the gain is more than the loss, so that introducing the lottery improves the seller's revenue. As this example indicates, lotteries help in optimal mechanism design by giving the seller more latitude to price discriminate among buyers with different preferences.
In general, a randomized mechanism can offer to the buyer a menu of prices for arbitrarily many lotteries. We call such a menu a lottery pricing, and likewise a deterministic pricing an item pricing. While in multiple agent settings randomized mechanisms can be more complicated, we show that any such mechanism can be interpreted as offering to each agent simultaneously a lottery pricing that is a function of values of other agents.
The question of whether and to what extent randomization helps in Bayesian optimal mechanism design is not merely a pedantic one. Mechanisms similar to lottery pricings are seen in practice. For example, the website priceline.com routinely sells airline tickets to customers without disclosing at the time of sale crucial details such as the time of travel, carrier, etc. While customers are unaware of the distribution from which the final service is picked, the tradeoffs for customers are similar-the uncertainty in the quality of the final item against the cheaper price.
Until recently, the largest gap known between item pricings and lottery pricings for a single agent was a gap of 3/2 due to Pavlov [15] ; For the special case where values for different items are independent, Thanassoulis gave the best gap example with a gap of 1.1. In recent work Briest et al. [6] show that in single-agent settings in fact the gap between lottery pricings and item pricings can be unbounded even with only 4 items. Specifically, they construct a discrete distribution over the agent's values, with each pair of value vectors having a large "angle" between them (and therefore representing different segments of the market). Then, a lottery pricing, by offering different distributions to different segments, can obtain nearly the entire social value in the system, whereas, a deterministic item pricing cannot price discriminate as effectively. Briest et al. show that when the number of items is at least 4, an unlimited number of such value vectors can be packed into the distribution, leading to an unbounded gap between the revenues of the optimal item and lottery pricings. However the value distributions they construct are quite unnatural with the values of different item distributions being correlated in a specific way. In this paper we show that the gap between lottery pricings and item pricings is small for distributions involving limited correlation between items.
We further extend these results to the multiple-agent setting with the seller facing a general feasibility constraint, obtaining the first results of this kind. Mechanism design in the multiple-agent multi-parameter setting is poorly understood [19] . Until recently there were no general characterizations for optimal or approximately optimal mechanisms similar to Myerson's for the single-parameter case. Chawla et al. [9] recently developed constant-factor approximations to optimal deterministic mechanisms in this setting for a certain class of feasibility constraints (namely matroids and related set systems). We extend their results to show that their (deterministic) mechanisms achieve a constant factor approximation with respect to the optimal randomized mechanism as well, again implying a small gap between randomized and deterministic mechanisms.
Our results and techniques
We follow a technique introduced in [8] for relating multiparameter mechanisms to mechanisms for a related singleparameter problem. Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [8] relate a single unit-demand agent m-item mechanism de-sign problem to an m-agent single-item auction setting, by "splitting" the unit-demand agent into m independent "representatives" (reps, for short). They argue that the increased competition among reps benefits the seller and leads to higher revenue. Formally, given an item pricing p there exists a truthful mechanism A p that allocates an item to representative i whenever p allocates item i to the multiparameter agent (that is, A p has the "same" allocation rule as p). Furthermore, the price that A p charges is no less than the price that p charges for any instantiation of values. Therefore, the expected revenue of the optimal multiparameter mechanism is bounded above by the expected revenue of Myerson's mechanism for the corresponding singleparameter problem. Chawla et al. use this upper bound to design an item pricing for the multi-parameter problem with revenue within a factor of 3 of the expected revenue of Myerson's mechanism for the corresponding single-parameter instance with reps, thereby obtaining a 3-approximation to the optimal deterministic mechanism for the single-agent problem.
Unfortunately the upper bound of the expected revenue of Myerson's mechanism does not hold for randomized mechanisms. Section 6 gives an example where the revenue of Myerson's mechanism for the single-parameter instance with reps is a factor of 1.13 smaller than that of the optimal lottery pricing for the multi-parameter instance. In fact, the mechanism A L with the "same" allocation rule as a lottery pricing L may obtain zero revenue even when the lottery pricing obtains non-zero revenue. Our main result is that the gap between Myerson's mechanism and the optimal lottery pricing is no larger than a factor of 2. Specifically, given a lottery pricing, we can construct two mechanisms, one being A L and the other a Vickrey auction, such that the sum of the revenues of the two mechanisms is an upper bound on the revenue of the lottery pricing. Combining this with the result of Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg (and an improvement over it in [9] ), we get that for a single unitdemand agent multi-parameter problem, the gap between lottery pricings and item pricings is at most 4.
Chawla et al.'s result as well as our factor-of-4 gap holds for instances where the values of the agent for different items are independent. For a unit-demand agent, this independence assumption is unrealistic. However, on the other end of the spectrum, Briest et al. show that with arbitrary correlations between item values, the gap can be unbounded. We therefore examine the following natural model for values involving limited correlation, that we call the common base value model. The type of the unit-demand agent is composed of m + 1 independent components -(t0, t1, · · · , tm); the agent's value for item i is vi = t0 + ti. Here t0 can be thought of as the buyer's "base" value for obtaining any of the items, and the ti's represent the buyer's perceived quality of the different items. The common base value introduces a positive correlation between values of different items 1 . In this correlated distribution setting we show that the gap between randomized and deterministic mechanisms is at most a factor of 8. Once again our approach is to start with an optimal lottery pricing for the multi-parameter instance, construct an ensemble of mechanisms based on it for the corresponding single-parameter instance with reps, and then construct a pricing for the multi-parameter instance based on the mechanisms.
Our results extend to multi-agent instances as well. The simplest multi-agent setting we consider involves n agents and m items (with copies), where the seller faces a supply constraint for each of the items. A feasible allocation is a matching between agents and items that respects multiplicities of items. More generally, we consider settings where the seller faces a matroid feasibility constraint-any feasible allocation must be an independent set in a given matroid in addition to allocating at most one item per agent (see Section 5.2 for the definition of a matroid). In both these cases we show that the gap between the expected revenue of the optimal randomized and the optimal deterministic mechanisms is a small constant factor 2 . Once again we rely on the approach of relating the multi-parameter instance to a single-parameter instance where each unit-demand agent is split into multiple selfish reps or "pseudo-agents". This approach was first developed in [9] . In particular we showed in [9] that for the settings described above, there exist deterministic mechanisms that obtain revenue within a constant factor of the revenue of Myerson's mechanism for the related single-parameter instance. In Section 5 we show that the revenue of any randomized mechanism for these settings can be bounded from above by 5 times the revenue of Myerson's mechanism for the single-parameter instance. The challenge in these settings is to ensure that the mechanisms that we construct satisfy the non-trivial feasibility constraint that the seller faces.
Related work
As mentioned earlier, randomness is applied extensively in prior-free mechanism design (see, e.g., [11] and references therein). While symmetric deterministic mechanisms provably cannot obtain any guarantees on revenue in that setting, Aggarwal et al. [1] show that by exploiting asymmetry prior-free mechanisms can be derandomized at a constant factor loss in revenue.
Our mechanism design setting with unit-demand agents is closely related to the standard setting for envy-free pricing problems considered in literature [10, 4, 3, 5, 8] ; Those works study the single-agent problem with a correlated value distribution and aim to approximate the optimal deterministic mechanism (item pricing). Our single-agent setting is most closely related to the work of Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [8] who gave a 3 approximation to the optimal deterministic mechanism for single-agent product-distribution instances, and builds upon techniques developed in that work.
In economics literature, the study of Bayesian optimal mechanisms has focused on deterministic mechanisms. It is well-known that for single-parameter instances the optimal mechanism is deterministic [14, 16] . Following Myerson's result [14] for single-parameter mechanisms, there were a number of attempts to obtain simple characterizations of optimal mechanisms in the multi-parameter setting [13, 17, 19] , however no general-purpose characterization of such mechanisms is known [19] . Recently Chawla et al. [9] gave the first approximations to optimal deterministic mechanisms for a large class of multi-parameter problems. This paper extends techniques developed in that work and one of the implications of our work is that the mechanisms developed in [9] are approximately-optimal with respect to the optimal randomized mechanisms as well.
The study of the benefit of randomness in multi-parameter mechanism design was initiated by Thanassoulis [18] who presented single-parameter instances with valuations drawn from product distributions where randomness helps increase the revenue by about 8-10%. Manelli and Vincent [12] and Pavlov [15] presented other examples with small gaps. Briest et al. [6] were the first to uncover the extent of the benefit of randomization, as well as to study the hardness of finding the optimal randomized mechanism in single-parameter settings. They showed that lottery pricings can be arbitrarily better than item pricings in terms of revenue even for the case of 4 items offered to a single agent.
DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM SET-UP

Bayesian optimal mechanism design
We study the following mechanism design problem. There is one seller offering m services indexed by the set J = [m], and n "unit-demand" agents indexed by the set I = [n]. Agents are risk-neutral and are each interested in buying any one of the m services. Agent i has value vij for service j which is a random variable. Let Ji = {i} × J. Values are drawn from the (known) joint distribution F. The seller faces no costs for providing service, but must satisfy certain feasibility constraints (e.g. supply constraints in a limited supply setting). We represent these feasibility constraints as a set system S over pairs (i, j), that is, S ⊆ 2 I×J . Each subset A of I × J in S is a feasible allocation of services to agents, and |A ∩ Ji| ≤ 1 for all agents i. We use v−i to denote the vector of values of all agents except agent i.
The seller's goal is to maximize her revenue in expectation over the buyers' valuations. We call this problem the Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand (optimal) mechanism design problem (BMUMD). The tuple (I × J, S, F) defines an instance of this problem. A deterministic mechanism for this problem maps any set of bids b to an allocation M (b) ∈ S and a pricing π(b) with a price πi to be paid by agent i. A randomized mechanism maps a set of bids to a distribution over S; we use M (b) to denote this distribution over J.
We focus on the class of incentive compatible mechanisms 3 and will hereafter assume that b = v. We use R M I (v) to denote the revenue of a mechanism M for instance I at valuation vector v:
where π is the pricing rule for M . We drop the subscript I when it is clear from the context. To aid disambiguation, we sometimes use
. We consider the following special cases of the BMUMD:
Setting 1: Single agent with independent values. n = 1; The agent's value for service j is an independent random variable with distribution Fj and density fj .
Setting 2: Single agent with a common base value. n = 1; The agent's type, {t0, · · · , tm}, is m + 1 dimensional. tj is distributed independently according to Fj. The agent's value for service j is vj = t0 + tj .
Setting 3: Multiple unit-demand agents with matroid feasibility constraint. The setting has n unitdemand agents. Agent i's value for item j ∈ J is distributed independently according to Fij with density function fij . The feasibility constraint S is the intersection of the unit-demand constraint for the agents with a general matroid over I × J.
In other words, we are given a matroid M over the ground set I × J (see Section 5.2 for a definition), and a set A belongs to S if and only if A is independent in M and for all i, |A ∩ Ji| ≤ 1. An example of this setting is the travel agency problem described in Section 1.
Setting 4: Multiple unit-demand, common base value agents with matroid feasibility constraint. Same as the previous setting, except that agent i's value distribution is now composed of m + 1 independent components, following the common base value model described in Setting 2.
Single-parameter mechanism design
An instance of the single-parameter Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem (abbreviated BSMD) is given by the tuple (I, S, F). There is a seller offering m = |I| services to n = m single-parameter agents, with service i targetted towards agent i. Agent i's value vi for getting served is a random variable. We use v−i to denote the vector of values of all agents except agent i. The seller faces a feasibility constraint specified by a set system S ⊆ 2 I , and is allowed to serve any set of agents in S. As in the multi parameter case, a mechanism M for this problem is a function that maps a vector of values v to an allocation M (v) ∈ S and a pricing π(v). Myerson's seminal work describes the revenue maximizing mechanism for BSMD; this optimal mechanism is deterministic.
Relating multi-parameter MD to single-parameter MD
In previous work [9] we presented a general reduction from the multi-parameter optimal mechanism design problem to the single-parameter setting. This approach begins with defining an instance I reps of the BSMD given an instance I of the BMUMD. Our previous work then shows that for several kinds of feasibility constraints there exists a deterministic mechanism for I with revenue at least a constant fraction of that of the optimal mechanism for I reps . We state these results below without proof.
We begin by describing the instance I reps . Consider an instance I = (I × J, S, F) of the BMUMD. We define a new instance of the BSMD in the following manner. We split each agent in I into |J| distinct representatives (hereafter called "reps" or "pseudo-agents"). Each pseudo-agent (i, j) ∈ I × J is interested in only the item (i, j) and behaves independently of (and potentially to the detriment of) other pseudo-agents. The feasibility constraint on services stays the same as before. The instance is denoted I reps . I reps is similar to I except that it involves more competition (among different pseudo-agents corresponding to the same multi-parameter agent). Therefore it is natural to expect that a seller can obtain more revenue in the instance I reps than in I. The following results show that in Settings 1 and 3 it cannot obtain too much more. Theorem 1. (Theorem 6 and 8 in [9] ) Given an instance I of the single agent BMUMD (Setting 1), there exists a truthful deterministic mechanism for I, whose revenue is at least 1/2 of the revenue of any truthful mechanism for the instance I
reps .
The mechanism in [9] for Setting 3 does not always admit a dominant strategy equilibrium. However, the mechanism obtains good revenue whenever any agent with a (weakly) dominant strategy follows that strategy (with other agents behaving arbitrarily). Formally, this is a notion of equilibrium that is weaker than dominant strategy equilibrium; in [9] it is called a partial dominant strategy equilibrium (PDSE). Given these bounds on the performance of the optimal deterministic mechanism for I in terms of the revenue of the optimal truthful mechanism for I reps , our goal through the rest of the paper is to relate the revenue of an optimal randomized mechanism for I to that of the optimal truthful mechanism for I reps . In Section 3 we set up terminology for discussing randomized mechanisms, and in Sections 4 and 5 we present the actual bounds.
RANDOMIZED MECHANISMS AND LOTTERIES
We now define a class of mechanisms for the BMUMD that will be useful in our analysis. In Section 3.2 we show that this class encompasses arbitrary randomized mechanisms.
Lotteries or random allocations
An m-dimensional lottery is a vector ℓ = (q1, · · · , qm, p) where p is the price of the lottery and (q1, · · · , qm) is a probability distribution over m items,
A lottery pricing L = {ℓ1, ℓ2, · · · } is a randomized selling mechanism for m items targeted towards a single unit-demand buyer where the buyer is offered a collection of (an arbitrary number of) lotteries. The buyer can select any one or no lottery from the collection, and is then allocated an item drawn from the probability distribution defined by the lottery and charged the price of the lottery. A rational riskneutral buyer selects the lottery that maximizes her utility:
A lottery-based mechanism M L for m services targeted towards n agents is a randomized selling mechanism defined through an ensemble of lottery pricings L. M L and L satisfy the following properties:
is an m-dimensional lottery pricing targeted toward agent i.
Li(v)
is a function of v−i, the values of all agents other than agent i. 
The mechanism M
L is implemented as follows. It first elicits bids b from agents, and then offers to agent i (simultaneously with other agents) the lottery pricing Li(b). Let ℓi(b) denote the lottery picked by agent i and let qij (b) denote the probability with which lottery ℓi(b) offers service j to agent i. Agent i is allocated item j with probability qij (b).
Randomized mechanisms as lotteries
We now show that every incentive compatible randomized mechanism for the BMUMD can be interpreted as a truthful lottery-based mechanism. We note that this observation does not hold for Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms.
Lemma 3. Every incentive-compatible randomized mechanism for a multi-agent BMUMD problem is equivalent to a lottery-based mechanism.
Proof. Given a mechanism M with randomized allocation rule M (v) and pricing rule π(v) we define a lotterybased mechanism as follows. Consider an agent i and a fixed instantiation of v−i. Then for every instantiation of vi, consider the probabilities with which M allocates service j to agent i, as well as the prices that M charges. Each such probability vector along with the corresponding price forms a lottery in Li(v−i) in the new mechanism. Formally,
We now claim that the allocation rule and pricing rule of the new mechanism is precisely the same as the old mechanism. If not, for some value vector v and for some agent i,
, where the former is the allocation and price rule for the lotterybased mechanism and the latter the allocation and price rule for the original mechanism M . But, given our construction, Note that these allocations to agents are not necessarily done independently; The feasibility constraint may require correlations between items allocated to different agents. However these details do not affect our analysis, so we ignore them. 5 This condition is weaker than may be necessary for certain kinds of feasibility constraints S, but suffices for our purpose.
A mechanism for I reps based on lotteries
As noted earlier, our main goal is to relate the revenue of lottery-based mechanisms for an instance I of the BMUMD to the optimal mechanism for the corresponding instance I reps of the BSMD. We now describe a mechanism for I reps based on a given lottery-based mechanism for I.
Consider an instance I = (I × J, S, F) of the BMUMD. Given a lottery-based mechanism M L for I that uses the ensemble of lottery pricings L, we define a mechanism A L for the instance I reps . Based on L, the mechanism A L forms a one dimensional lottery pricing for each of the mn pseudo-agents in I × J. The lottery pricing offered to pseudo-agent (i, j), which we denote Lij, is a function of v−ij and is derived from the lottery pricing Li ∈ L as follows. Given a valuation vector v−ij , for each ℓ = (qi1, qi2, . . . , qim, p) ∈ Li(v−i), A L adds a lottery ℓj = (q ′ , p ′ ) to Lij defined by q ′ = qij ; and
where the term uij (v−ij) ≥ 0 is chosen to be the least value ensuring that the lottery preferred by pseudo-agent (i, j) when vij = 0 (if any) has a non-negative price. We note the following properties of A L :
1. (truthfulness) That A L is truthful follows immediately from the fact that the one dimensional lottery pricing Lij offered to pseudo-agent (i, j) does not depend on vij , and the pseudo-agent may choose any lottery from Lij .
(allocation rule) Suppose first that for (i, j) and some
v−ij, uij(v−ij ) = 0. Then for any vij , the utility of pseudo-agent (i, j) from lottery ℓj ∈ Lij is the same as utility of agent i from lottery ℓ ∈ Li. Therefore with uij(v−ij ) = 0, in M L agent i purchases lottery ℓ ∈ Li if and only if, in A L the pseudo-agent (i, j) purchases lottery ℓj ∈ Lij . Moreover, since the price shifts uij (v−ij) we apply are the same for every lottery offered to (i, j), the only manner in which preferences can change is if the pseudo-agent obtains negative utility from his preferred lottery, in which case he chooses to buy no lottery at all. However, our choice of uij (v−ij) ensures that the agent obtains non-negative utility at vij = 0 and thus also at arbitrary vij , and so the allocation rule of A L is identical to that of M L .
3. (feasibility) Feasibility follows immediately from the fact that M L satisfies feasibility and the allocation rules of the two mechanisms are identical.
(nonnegative revenue) Our choice of uij (v−ij) ensures
that the revenue A L receives from each agent is always nonnegative; this is critical in later arguments, since it allows us to claim that the revenue that A L obtains from any subset of the pseudo-agents is bounded from above by the total expected revenue of A L .
We now relate the revenues of M L and A L . While in general A L can make partial allocations to many agents simultaneously, we bound its revenue in terms of the contributions by only a subset of the pseudo-agents, namely one respecting the unit-demand constraints of agents in I. This is useful in later arguments. Formally, a unit-demand allocation function, a, is a function mapping valuation vectors to sets of pseudo-agents which respects the unit-demand constraint, i.e. for any valuation vector v and i ∈ I, |a(v)∩Ji| ≤ 1. The following lemma relates the revenue of M L to the revenue that A L derives from agents in a(v) for any unit-demand allocation function a.
Lemma 4. For any unit-demand allocation function a and any valuation vector v, we have
anism M L at v can be written as the sum of the revenues from the constituent lottery pricings:
If we define ℓi(v) = (qi1(v), . . . , qim(v), pi(v)) ∈ Li to be the lottery chosen by agent i at v, then R
, which is just the price pi(v), can be written as
for any j, where R A L ij (v) is the revenue of mechanism A L from the pseudo-agent (i, j). Furthermore, since agent i would never elect to purchase a lottery yielding negative utility, we also have that
Note that we designed A L such it receives nonnegative revenue from every pseudo-agent, and a contains at most one pseudo-agent (i, j) for any i; so by applying one of (1) or (2) for each i according to which pseudo-agents a(v) contains, we get that
the claimed bound.
SINGLE-AGENT SETTING
In this section we focus on instances of the BMUMD involving a single agent and m items. In the single agent setting, randomized and deterministic mechanisms become simply lotteries and pricings, respectively. Briest et al. [6] demonstrated that when values for different items are arbitrarily correlated, it is possible to construct examples where the ratio between the optimal expected revenues from lotteries and pricings is unbounded. We show that in the absence of such correlation this ratio is small. Specifically, when values are distributed independently, the ratio is no more than 4 (Section 4.1). Moreover, when values have a certain kind of positive correlation (common base value; Setting 2 described in Section 2.1), the ratio is at most 8 (Section 4.2).
Independent values (Setting 1)
Given an instance I of the single agent BMUMD in Setting 1, consider the form of the associated instance I reps . Note that while each pseudo-agent desires a different item, the fact that only one item may be sold means they are effectively competing for the same thing, the privilege of being served. Thus, I
reps can be thought of as being in a singleitem auction setting. This observation leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For any instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 1, the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism is at least one-fourth the revenue of the optimal randomized mechanism.
Proof. As previously observed, any randomized mechanism in the single-agent setting is precisely a lottery pricing L. Let the mechanism A L be as described in Section 3.
Applying Lemma 4 with a(v)
since the qi(v)'s sum to at most one. The key observation is that the second term is precisely the revenue that the Vickrey auction V would achieve in the instance I reps given bids v; so we get that in expectation
and need only apply Theorem 1 to prove the result.
Common base value model (Setting 2)
We demonstrate that a result similar to that of the previous section holds even in the presence of certain types of correlation. Consider again the single agent setting; since the agent is unit demand, it makes sense to think of the services being offered as perfect substitutes. A natural form of correlation, then, would be for the agent to have some "base" value for being served (regardless of which service is received), plus an additive deviation specific to the particular service received.
In the setting we consider, agents' types consist of (m + 1) independently distributed values {t0, t1, . . . , tm}, with t0 being the base value for getting served and ti being the additional benefit of obtaining service i; the agent's value for item i becomes vi = ti + t0. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given an instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 2, the revenue of any lottery system L for I satisfies R M L ≤ 8R p , for some pricing p for I.
Proof. We begin by proving a bound with a weaker multiplicative factor of 9 and then show how to improve it to a factor of 8. Our main technique is to consider an uncorrelated setting I ′ derived from I. We define I ′ to be a single agent setting with (m + 1) items, and interpret the values {t0, . . . , tm} making up an agent's type in I as being the values of the agent in setting I ′ for the (m + 1) items. In keeping with I, the feasibility constraint we associate with I ′ is that we may sell item 0, and at most one additional item from among items 1, . . . , m. Note that the agent in I ′ is not a unit-demand agent.
We now construct a lottery system L ′ for instance I ′ from L. Let ℓ = (q1, . . . , qm, p) be a lottery in L. Define q0 = P m i=1 qi, and construct ℓ ′ = (q0, . . . , qm, p). Note that ℓ ′ does not necessarily satisfy the requirement that the qi's sum to at most one; it does, however, satisfy the feasibility constraint indicated for I ′ . We may thus still apply the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 5, albeit with a worsened constant. Specifically, for any setting of t0, . . . , tm, note that the the utility an agent in I receives from a particular lottery
which is precisely the utility a corresponding agent in I ′ would receive from the corresponding ℓ ′ ∈ L ′ . We thus have
Consider applying the proof of Lemma 5 to L
′ . Due to the less restrictive feasibility constraint (
where the mechanisms A L ′ and V ′ are interpreted as being in the setting I reps′ associated with I ′ , and M ′ is the optimal mechanism in this setting. In order to prove a bound of the form desired, however, we need to relate a mechanism in the setting I reps′ to a deterministic one (a pricing) in I. The key observation is that our feasibility constraint in I reps′ (carried over from I ′ ) means that M ′ may make decisions about allocations and prices for pseudo-agent 0 separately from those for pseudo-agents 1, . . . , m; as such, M ′ effectively consists of two mechanisms, one serving pseudoagent 0 and another serving pseudo-agents 1, . . . , m, both under a unit-demand constraint. Now, the optimal mechanism for serving the lone single-parameter pseudo-agent is a pricing, and Theorem 1 gives us that a mechanism serving pseudo-agents 1, . . . , m is within a factor of 2 of a pricing on m items; so recalling that an agent in setting I has a value of vi = ti + t0 for item i (and hence offering the above prices in I can only yield more revenue), we can see that
where p is the optimal pricing for the setting I. In order to improve the factor from 9 to 8, we employ better bounds on the contribution of t0 and the contribution of other values to the revenue of a mechanism for I reps′ , depending on the value vector at which they are evaluated. Denote these quantities as R M 0 (t) and R M −0 (t) respectively, for a mechanism M at a particular valuation vector t. Now, as previously noted, the optimal mechanism M in I reps′ may treat pseudo-agent 0 independently from pseudo-agents 1, . . . , m; thus, we have that any mechanism M in this setting must satisfy both
Since we know that P m i=1 qi ≤ 1, when t0 is the maximum among all the ti, Lemma 4 implies
On the other hand, when one of t1, . . . , tm takes on the maximum value, we end up with, for some i,
Combining these two gives us a pointwise guarantee of
Therefore, if we let p be the optimal pricing for I, we get
implying the claimed bound of 8.
MULTI-AGENT SETTING
In this section we consider multi-agent versions of the BMUMD and once again show that the benefit of randomness is only a small constant factor. The motivating example for the settings we study is the following multi-item auction problem: the seller has m different items to sell, each with a multiplicity of kj respectively; the seller's goal is to allocate up to one item per agent while respecting the supply constraints. The set system defined by this problem consists of all matchings between agents and a multiset over items. Our techniques in fact extend to more general set systems that are intersections of the unit-demand constraint over agents and a general matroid constraint. We define these formally in the following section.
Matroids and related set systems
The set system (X, S) over a universe X is called a matroid if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. (heredity) For every A ∈ S, B ⊂ A implies B ∈ S.
(augmentation) For every A, B ∈ S with |A| > |B|,
there exists e ∈ A \ B such that B ∪ {e} ∈ S.
Sets in S are called independent, and maximal independent sets are called bases. A simple consequence of the above properties is that all bases are equal in size.
A k-uniform matroid on the universe X is a matroid where every subset of X of size at most k is independent. A partition matroid (X, S) is a union of two or more uniform matroids {(Xi, Mi)}i, where {Xi}i is a partition of X and S = {∪iAi : Ai ∈ Mi ∀i}. A set system (X, S) is called a matroid intersection if there are two matroids (X, M1) and (X, M2), such that S = M1 ∩M2. An example of a matroid intersection is a matching in a bipartite graph.
The following proposition is a simple consequence of the above conditions on matroid set systems (see, for example, [7] ) and will be useful in our analysis.
Proposition 7. Let B1 and B2 be arbitrary independent sets in some matroid set system E . Then there exists a set B ′ 2 ⊆ B2 and a one to one function g : B ′ 2 → B1 such that for all e ∈ B ′ 2 , B1 \ {g(e)} ∪ {e} is independent in E , and for all e ∈ B2 \ B ′ 2 , B1 ∪ {e} is independent in E .
Independent values (Setting 3)
As noted earlier, the motivation for this setting arises in the context of multi-unit multi-item auctions. Consider, in particular, a seller with m different items and kj copies of item j for all j. Each of the n unit-demand buyers have independently distributed values for each item. The seller's constraint is to allocate item j to no more than kj agents, and to allocate at most one item to each agent. Note that the set system defined by this feasibility constraint is a matroid intersection. The unit-demand constraint and the item supply constraints are each instances of partition matroids. Thus the system S in this setting can be seen to be an intersection of two partition matroids.
More generally, in this section we consider set systems S that are intersections of the partition matroid corresponding to the unit-demand constraint over agents (call it S1) and another general matroid over I × J (call it S2).
Given a randomized mechanism M in this setting, a natural question is whether we can simply apply the argument of Lemma 5 to each agent in turn to get a bound on revenue. If we attempted to do this, each agent would yield two mechanisms-one with the same allocation as M , and one which always serves the pseudo-agent corresponding to the item the agent places the highest value on. While combining the former across agents would produce the same overall allocation as M (which must be feasible), combining the latter is problematic, because assigning to every agent their highest valued item may not produce a feasible allocation. In order to successfully bound the revenue of M , therefore, we need to work with all agents at once, and find a feasible allocation which allows us to relate the second term in the bound from Lemma 4 to the revenue of one (or more) mechanism(s) for I reps . As before, our proof consists of three steps:
1. From Lemma 3, we note that any randomized mechanism for this problem can be seen as a lottery-based mechanism.
2. We bound the revenue of any lottery-based mechanism for an instance I of the BMUMD by those of a collection of three truthful deterministic mechanisms for the corresponding single-parameter instance with representatives, I reps .
3. We use the result in [9] to construct a deterministic mechanism for I whose revenue is within a constant factor of the optimal revenue for I reps .
We now expand on step 2. Proof. We define three truthful deterministic mechanisms M1, M2, M3 for I reps , all facing the same feasibility constraint S as the set of lottery pricings L, such that
The second inequality follows from the optimality of Myerson's mechanism for single parameter settings.
Consider the I reps setting and fix an instantiation of values v. Let A1(v) denote the set of pseudo-agents that belong to the maximum-valued feasible set (we drop the argument v wherever it is obvious). Among the remaining (I × J) \ A1 pseudo-agents, again let A2 denote the set of pseudo-agents that belong to the maximum-valued feasible set i.e.
A2(v) = argmax
Note that A1(v) is a unit-demand allocation function. Therefore, Lemma 4 implies that
We now define the three mechanisms M1, M2 and M3 for I reps . Mechanism M1 is A L and so R M 1 is exactly Term1. If mechanisms M2 and M3 can be defined in such a way that 2(R M 2 + R M 3 ) is at least Term2, this would prove (3). Now, Proposition 7 implies the existence of two one to one partial functions with the following properties.
g1(e) is undefined and A1 ∪ {e} ∈ S1, or g1(e) is defined and A1 \ {g1(e)} ∪ {e} ∈ S1 g2 : A2 → A1 s.t. ∀e ∈ A2 :
g2(e) is undefined and A1 ∪ {e} ∈ S2, or g2(e) is defined and A1 \ {g2(e)} ∪ {e} ∈ S2
Note that the maximality of A1 implies that every element of A2 has an image under either g1 or g2 or both. We define the mechanisms M2 and M3 by specifying their allocation rules. Given a valuation vector v, the mechanism M2 serves only those pseudo-agents (i, j) that belong to A1 and for which vij ≥ v g −1
is defined at that point). Likewise, mechanism M3 serves only those pseudo-agents (i, j) ∈ A1 that have vij
/2 (if defined). We note that M2 and M3 have monotone allocation rules, and are therefore truthful. Truthful payments can be defined appropriately. They also satisfy the feasibility constraint S.
We now lower bound the revenue for M2 and M3 through the following two claims. Claim 1. Twice the combined revenue of mechanisms M2 and M3 is no less than the sum of values of all pseudo-agents in A2, i.e.,
Proof. Consider any pseudo-agent (i, j) ∈ A2, and the pseudo-agents g1(i, j) and g2(i, j) ∈ A1 if defined. Note that A ′ 1 = A1 ∪ (i, j) \ {g1(i, j), g2(i, j)} is feasible. Suppose both v g 1 (i,j) and v g 2 (i,j) are less than vij /2; then the set A ′ 1 is a feasible set and v(A ′ 1 ) > v(A1) which is a contradiction to the optimality of A1. Thus one of v g 1 (i,j) or v g 2 (i,j) must be at least vij /2 and we get this amount in M2 or M3 respectively.
Claim 2. The sum of values of all pseudo-agents in A2
is no less than Term2:
Proof. Consider the n × m matrix of all probabilities qij (v). This matrix arose from a feasible randomized mechanism; it therefore represents a probability distribution over feasible sets and can be represented as a convex combination of feasible sets. In this probability matrix, replace with zeros all the entries (i, j) ∈ A1. The newly obtained matrix can be represented as a convex combination of feasible sets all of which have a zero entry for every (i, j) ∈ A1. Then the claim follows by the definition of A2. (3) and (4) complete the proof of Lemma 8.
Claims 1 and 2 together with Equations
Combining the lemma with Theorem 2 we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 9. The revenue obtained by any truthful randomized mechanism for an instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 3 is at most 40 times the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism for I implemented in partial dominant strategies. In the special case of multi-unit multi-item auctions, the revenue of any truthful randomized mechanism is at most 33.75 times the revenue of the optimal truthful deterministic mechanism.
Common base value model (Setting 4)
We note that by applying the same approach as in Section 4.2, we can extend the results in Theorem 9 to Setting 4 while losing an extra factor of 4 in the gap between randomized and deterministic mechanisms. We omit the proof.
A GAP EXAMPLE
We showed in Sections 4 and 5 that the revenue of Myerson's mechanism for I reps gives an upper bound within constant factors to the revenue of an optimal randomized mechanism for I. A natural question is whether it is possible to tighten our analysis to show that the former is a true upper bound on the latter, or whether there are instances where this does not hold. In this section we give an example where the revenue of a lottery pricing for a single agent BMUMD instance I is 1.13 times the revenue of Myerson's mechanism for the instance I reps . The instance I is defined as follows. There is a single agent with i. i. d. valuations for two items, distributed according to the equal-revenue distribution bounded at n. Formally, the valuations v1 and v2 for items 1 and 2 have cdfs F1 and F2 such that
Note that the distributions are regular. For the single parameter setting I reps , an upper bound on the expected revenue of any mechanism can be obtained by removing the feasibility constraint of allocating to a single agent at a time. Then, the optimal revenue with the feasibility constraint is no more than twice the optimal revenue that can be obtained by a single agent alone. The latter, for the equal revenue distribution, is 1 regardless of the price charged to the agent. Therefore, the optimal revenue for I reps is bounded above by 2. The same bound also applies to the revenue of any item pricing for I. The first two coordinates in every lottery denote the probabilities with which items 1 and 2 are offered by that lottery and the third coordinate is the price. Figure 2 shows the allocation function of this lottery pricing. In particular, Ri for i ∈ [3] is the set of valuations where lottery i is bought. The probability mass of regions R2 and R3 together can be computed to be 2(4/3n + O(log n/n 2 )). The probability mass of region R1 is 0.4 + 0.08 ln 4 − o(1) ≈ 0.51. Therefore, the revenue of L can be computed to be 5/2 · 0.51 + 3n/8 · 8/3n + o(1) = 2.275 + o(1). This is a factor of 1.13 higher than the optimal revenue for I reps , or the revenue of any item pricing for I.
DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We show that in multi-parameter Bayesian optimal mechanism design the benefit of randomness is only a small constant factor when agents are unit-demand and their values for different items have little or no correlation. We note that these results continue to hold if the seller has costs on providing service that are additive over the different services offered. We believe that the results should also extend to instances involving arbitrary positive correlation between values of a single agent for items that are substitutes (the unit-demand constraint). For example, it would be interesting to extend our result to the multiplicative values model of Armstrong [2] . Another open problem is to extend our techniques beyond the unit-demand setting. This may lead to a better understanding of and approximations to optimal mechanism design in those settings, for which nothing is known as yet.
